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How Did Different Restaurant Segments Perform Differently through the
Recession? An ARIMA with Intervention Analysis on US Restaurant
Stock Indices
Introduction
The restaurant industry in the United States represents an inordinately large part
of the national economy, and is one of the nation’s largest private employers. In
2012 alone, restaurant sales totaled over $630 billion and the industry employed
nearly 13 million people (NRA, 2012). The industry, like all other areas of the
American economy, was profoundly affected by the economic recession that
began in 2007. As a result of that recession, consumer confidence declined, and
consumers therefore cut back on much of their discretionary spending; restaurant
spending representing a substantial portion of that cutback (Barbardo and
Uchitelle, 2008).
This decline in consumer spending, predictably, had an impact on
restaurant stock prices. The Dow Jones U.S. Restaurant Index (DJRI) dropped by
13% in 2008 alone (CBS News, 2009). Still, to speak of the restaurant industry as
a whole is to over-simplify the picture. The DJRI, for instance, includes full
service restaurants like Olive Garden and Red Lobster, while also including quick
service restaurants like McDonald’s. Because of the different level of consumer
spending each segment represents, it is likely that different segments of the
industry were affected differently by the most recent recession. Recent research
has shown that recessions have negative impacts on stock prices in general
(Collins, 2003), and has also shown that restaurant stocks, in particular, are
affected by recessions (Lee and Ha, 2012). Further research has shown that
restaurant stocks perform differently based on industry segment (Madanoglu, et.
al, 2012). There has not been, however, research performed testing whether the
recession of 2008 had distinct impacts on different segments of the restaurant
industry. The goal of this research, therefore, was to assess whether that is the
case.
This research examines two distinct segments of the restaurant industry,
the full service segment and the limited service segment, and is comprised of two
different studies, both of which seek to understand whether the recent recession
had differing impacts on these two distinct industry segments. The research
measures segment performance by examining the stock prices of restaurants
within those segments. The first analysis, a time series analysis, examines how
stock prices in each industry segment were hurt by the recession and how long it
took them to begin to recover from the recession. The second portion of the study
consists of a financial ratio analysis of the two segments both before and after the
recession to better understand how each segment survived the economic downturn.

This study examined nine hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: the recent recession did not significantly affect the stock
performance of the U.S. restaurant industry;
Hypothesis 2: the stock performance of the U.S. restaurant industry didn’t
significantly improve after the recession;
Hypothesis 3: the recent recession did not significantly affect the stock
performance of the limited service restaurant segment;
Hypothesis 4: the recent recession did not significantly affect the stock
performance of the full service restaurant segment;
Hypothesis 5: the stock performance of the limited service restaurant segment
didn’t significantly improve after the recession;
Hypothesis 6: the stock performance of the full service restaurant segment didn’t
significantly improve after the recession;
Hypothesis 7: there are no significant differences between the financial ratios of
the limited service restaurant segment and the full service restaurant segment
before the recession;
Hypothesis 8: there are no significant differences between the financial ratios of
the limited service restaurant segment before and after the recession; and
Hypothesis 9: there are no significant differences between the financial ratios of
the full service restaurant segment before and after the recession.
Review of Literature
Economic growth is generally cyclical, experiencing alternating periods of growth
and contraction, or recession. (Lee, 1955; and Schumpeter, 1954).
During recessionary periods economic indicators are largely negative; GDP is
reduced, workers' earnings fall, consumer spending declines, and ultimately
business profits decrease (Krugman, 2009). Consumer demand and corporate
profitability tend to fall at the early stage of a recession and that lack of
profitability has a negative impact on a business’ stock price (Mankiw, 1989).
Recessions generally decrease the velocity of money and squeeze profits, causing
stock prices to suffer (Patton, 2012), with some investors forecasting devaluation
of stocks by up to 40% (Gorenstein, 2011).
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the
United States experienced an economic recession – defined as consecutive
quarters of negative growth in gross domestic product - from December 2007
through June 2009 (The National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010). It is
believed that the recession was the worst one since the Great Depression in terms
of its duration and impact (Sum, Khatiwada, McLaughlin, & Palma, 2009). In the
first 18 months of the recession, gross domestic product (GDP) shrank about 5.1
percent (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2011). During this recession stock prices

in general fell 50%, losses much larger, relatively, than those associated with
earlier recessions (Dwyer, 2009).
The restaurant industry is particularly vulnerable during times of
economic distress (Gu, 1993), and this recession has been no different from
previous downturns. Eating and drinking establishments posted five consecutive
months of job losses, the first time that had happened sin 1958 (NRA, 2008). The
restaurant industry, generally speaking, has lower profit margins than other
industries, averaging between 2% and 6% (Skidelsky, 2009); further exacerbating
the effect recession has on the industry. As a result, stock prices within the
restaurant industry declined significantly. In February of 2009, the stock price of
the top 26 restaurant companies had lost an average 49.3% of their value from
their highest points over the past 52 weeks (Krantz, 2009).
All other things being equal, different restaurant segments tend to perform
differently as they have different styles of operation, target customers, and
financial characteristics (Gu, 1996). Full service restaurants generally rely on high
profit margins; sales of full service restaurant are mainly derived from customers’
discretionary expenditures. When recession comes, customer sentiment and
household income are lower, and full service restaurants are first to feel the
effects (Youn & Gu, 2010). Fast food restaurants, on the other hand, rely on large
sales volume to compensate for their lower profit margins. Their sales are
primarily necessity expenditures; therefore they have more steady revenues (Youn
& Gu, 2010).
Lee and Ha (2012) examined the effect of the recent recession on
restaurant sales, but did not differentiate among different industry segments.
Madanoglu, et al. (2008) examined risk-adjusted performance measures,
differentiating between casual and fast food restaurants, but did so prior to the
recession. Their research found that, during the period 1998 – 2002, casual dining
restaurants outperformed fast food restaurants, using the Sharpe Ratio as a
determinant. While the period 1998 – 2002 did include a recessionary period from
March of 2001, to November of 2001, Madanoglu, et al. examined the stock
performance of the two sectors for the five-year period as a whole, and did not
examine the recessionary period in particular. This paper fills a gap in the
literature by examining the effect of the recession of 2008 on restaurant stock
prices by industry segment.
The use of stock indices to measure general performance trends within
industries is a widely accepted practice, used to represent the common
characteristics of component stocks, such as trading on the same stock market
exchange, belonging to the same industry, or having the same market
capitalization (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2007). This study
developed stock indices for overall U.S. restaurant industry, the limited service
restaurant segment, and the full service restaurant segment and used them as

proxies of stock performance to examine possible impact the recent recession had
on the U.S. restaurant industry.
The more usual method for determining stock performance is to use a
market capitalization-weighted method (Standard & Poor’s, 2011). Market cap
represents the value of a corporation determined by multiplying the stock price of
a share by the number of total outstanding shares (U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2007). As indicated by Handley (2011) and Standard & Poor’s
(2011), a weighting based on market cap is thought to be more effective than
other measurements of stock performance. This method factors in the size of the
company in determining the performance of the industry segment as a whole. In
other words, the change of market cap of a company doesn’t affect the index. In
addition, compared to market cap weighted index, a price-weighted index, such as
the Dow Jones Industrial Average, can be heavily affected by a relatively small
shift in the price of a large company (Standard & Poor’s, 2011). Therefore, this
study adopted the S&P 500 approach, or market cap weighted method, to
calculate three stock indices.
Methods and Data
The main purpose of this study is to examine whether different types of restaurant
firms performed differently through and after the recent recession and to measure
the magnitudes of differences, if any. Based on North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS ), two segments of restaurant firms, limited service
restaurants (NAICS code 722211) and full service restaurants (NAICS
code722110), a total of sixty-nine publicly traded restaurant firms were identified
through Mergent Online database (see Appendix B). A weekly stock index was
developed for each of the two restaurant segments for analysis and comparison.
To gain a better understanding on the impact of the recession, an overall weekly
stock index based on all restaurants chosen was also developed and examined. In
addition, a weekly average of the S&P 500 index was included in the analysis to
show how the restaurant industry differed from others. To identify and measure
the differences of the weekly stock performance time series, the study used a
Time Series with Intervention Analysis procedure to identify the structural breaks
in each of the four weekly time series data sets.
To further understand how the restaurant industry was affected by the
recession, this study used paired samples t-tests to examine the differences for
each restaurant segment before and after the recession and used independent
samples t-test to test the differences between the two restaurant segments before
the recession.

Time Series with Intervention Analysis
Box-Jenkins Procedure
The Box-Jenkins procedure is a mathematically sophisticated time series analysis
method that fits Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models to
time series data (Box, Jenkins, & Reinsel, 1976). Autoregressive (AR) is a
process of calculating a time series value as the weighted average of previous
time series values; Integrated (I) represents order of differencing that makes data
stationary; and the Moving Average model (MA) states that a time series value is
the weighted average of forecasting errors of previous time series values. In other
words, ARIMA models time series data and forecasts future time series values
based on previous values and forecasting errors. An ARIMA model can be
denoted as ARIMA (p,d,q) where:
p represents the autoregressive p order;
q represents the moving average q order;
d represents the order of differencing for stationary transforming;
Because of its unique characteristics, the Box-Jenkins Procedure was
chosen for time series model fitting. Compared with other time series analysis
techniques, the Box-Jenkins procedure takes into consideration estimation error
residuals and lagged dependent variables, which makes model fitting more
accurate (Box, Jenkins, & Reinsel, 2008). Since it was introduced in the late
1970s, Box-Jenkins Procedure has achieved great popularity in different fields
including hospitality and tourism industry-related research. Song, Witt, & Li
(2009) found that most post-1990 studies on time series analysis of tourism
demand used the Box-Jenkins procedure. It also has been successfully used in
hotel and restaurant-related research (Chow, Shyu, & Wang, 1998; Luk, Ferrence,
& Gmel, 2008). Furthermore, the Box-Jenkins procedure has been proven to be
superior to other time series analysis techniques in some gaming related studies
(Cargill & Eadington, 1978; Shonkwiler, 1992; and Eisendrath, Bernhard, Lucas,
& Murphy, 2008). This study therefore used the Box-Jenkins procedure to fit an
ARIMA model on each of the four time series for analyses.
ARIMA with Intervention Analysis
Time series are often affected by external events or circumstances such as policy
changes, advertising promotions, and changes of economic environment. ARIMA
with Intervention Analysis, an advanced Box-Jenkins modeling approach, was
designed to identify the impact of those events by detecting structural breaks of a
time series (Bowerman, Connell, & Koehler, 2005). More specifically, by
detecting possible differences between the mean values before and after an
external event, this technique determines whether the event has significant impact
on a time series and assesses the magnitude of the impact, if any.
ARIMA with Intervention analysis has been widely used by event impact
studies in different areas. For example, Box and Tiao (1975) measured the impact

of air pollution law. Montgomery and Weatherby (1980) studied the impacts of
the Arab oil embargo on sales of electricity in United States. Fox (1996) assessed
the impact of natural disaster hurricane Hugo on hospital visits in Charleston,
South Carolina; Koski, Siren, Vuori, and Poikolainen (2007) tested the impact of
alcohol tax cuts on alcohol-positive sudden deaths in Finland; and Lau, Ip, and
Lam (2008) applied this technique in performance measurement. Furthermore, the
ARIMA with Intervention Analysis approach has been used in many hospitalityrelated event impact studies and proven successful. The identification of the
sudden acute respiratory syndrome in 2003 and terrorist attacks, like the one of
September 11, 2001, were events that significantly affected the hospitality and
tourism industry worldwide, the impact of which has been heavily studied and
ARIMA with Intervention Analysis approach is a commonly used method (Min,
2008; Lai, 2005; Chen, Kang, & Yang, 2008; Yu, Chan, & Fung, 2006; Fox, 1996;
Lee, Oh, & O’Leary, 2005; and Ismail, Yahaya, & Efendi, 2009 ).
Given the purpose of this study, ARIMA with Intervention Analysis
approach was used to determine how the recent recession affected the U.S.
restaurant industry. Based on the ARIMA models developed for the four weekly
stock index time series data sets, the Intervention analysis approach was used to
detect the structural breaks in the time series.
t-tests
Once the impact of the recession on restaurant stock indexes was assessed, ratio
analyses and comparisons were performed to reveal how the recession affected
restaurant firms with different financial characteristics. Twenty-six financial
ratios, thirteen before the recession and thirteen after the recession (ratios shown
in Appendix A), were calculated for each of the sixty-nine restaurant firms.
Financial ratios were retrieved from the WRDS database and multiple t-tests were
performed for comparisons.
Paired Samples t-test
The Paired Samples t-test, also known as repeated measures, is a method of
comparing mean values of one group of subjects when data are collected from
two different occasions or under two different conditions (Mendenhall, & Sincich,
2003). Using financial ratios immediately before and after the recession, this
method was used to test if any financial ratio changed significantly through the
recession. One Paired Samples t-test was performed for each ratio. A total of
twenty-six t-tests, thirteen for limited-service restaurant segment and thirteen for
full-service restaurant segment, were performed.
Independent Samples t-test
To further understand the uniqueness of each restaurant segment and how
different financial structures and operation performance might have led to
different stock performance through the recession, this study also performed
Independent Samples t-tests on each financial ratio to examine the differences

between the two segments prior to the recession. Since ratios from different
restaurant firms in two different segments needed to be compared, the
Independent Samples t-test was chosen because it is a statistical method of
comparing the mean scores of two different groups of subjects (Mendenhall, &
Sincich, 2003).
Data Collection and Preparation
This study used secondary data from the WRDS database. Daily S&P 500 index
and daily closing price of sixty-nine publicly traded restaurant firms from January
2, 2005 through December 26, 2010 (a total of 313 weeks) were collected for the
development of the time series; and annual reports of the sixty-nine publicly
traded restaurant firms for the years before and after the recession were retrieved
for the calculations of financial ratios.
Weekly time series were used to assess the impact of the recession. Daily
S&P 500 index and sixty-nine stock prices were converted to weekly data by
averaging the daily values. The daily S&P500 index was converted to a 313-week
time series. Using the S&P 500 approach, which is a capitalization-weighted
method, three 313-week stock index time series were created for the limitedservice restaurant segment (LSR), the full-service restaurant segment (FSR), and
the overall restaurant industry (OR). To be comparable, all restaurant stock
indexes were calculated using base value of 1,186.19, which was the weekly
average of S&P 500 index for the week of January 2, 2005, the first week of the
weekly time series.
Data Analysis and Results
To assess whether each of the four weekly time series was significantly affected
by the recession and experienced significant recovery after the recession, two
ARIMA with Intervention analyses were performed on each data set to identify
the impact week and recovery week. In this study, the week a time series started
showing significant decrease after the recession started was defined as impact
week; and the week a time series started showing significant increase after the
recession ended was defined as recovery week. Once the fluctuations of the time
series were identified and examined, multiple t-tests were performed to gain better
understandings of the differences between the limited-service restaurant firms,
full-service restaurant firms, the overall restaurant industry, and the S&P 500. The
procedures of the ARIMA with Intervention Analysis and t-tests on all four
weekly time series are identical.
ARIMA with Intervention Analysis
Model Fitting
Following the procedures proposed by Bowerman et al. (2005), an ARIMA model
was fitted to each of the four time series. Then, two intervention analyses were

performed based on the ARIMA model to test significant changes of mean levels.
SAS/ETS Time Series Forecasting System was used for the analyses.
The model fitting was a three-step process: 1) Model Identification:
identifying a tentative model; 2) Parameter Estimation: estimating the parameters
for the tentative model; and 3) Model Validation: diagnosing the tentative model
for adequacy with Ljung-Box test and identifying an improved model, if
necessary. The weekly data before the recession, which comprised data from the
week of January 2, 2005 through November 25, 2007, a total of 152 weeks, were
used for model fitting. After multiple similar models were tested, model
ARIMA(4,2,0) without constant was identified to be the model that fit all four
weekly time series. Tables 1 & 2 list the summary of parameter estimation and
Ljung-Box statistics for all four time series.
Table 1. Summary of Estimates of Model Parameters
Parameter
Coefficient
t-statistic
p-value
Full-service Restaurant Segment
AR1
-0.8318
-10.34
< 0.0005
-0.6465
-6.53
< 0.0005
AR2
AR3
-0.4576
-4.61
< 0.0005
AR4
-0.2517
-3.11
0.002
Limited-service Restaurant Segment
AR1
-0.9569
-11.99
< 0.0005
-0.7795
-7.61
< 0.0005
AR2
AR3
-0.5838
-5.64
< 0.0005
AR4
-0.2771
-3.42
0.001
Overall Restaurant Industry
AR1
-0.8545
-10.60
< 0.0005
-0.7192
-7.28
< 0.0005
AR2
AR3
-0.5187
-5.20
< 0.0005
AR4
-0.2395
-2.94
0.004
S&P 500
AR1
-0.9231
-11.31
< 0.0005
-0.749
-7.04
< 0.0005
AR2
AR3
-0.4598
-4.29
< 0.0005
AR4
-0.1916
-2.27
0.025

Table 2. Summary of Ljung-Box Chi-Square Statistic
Lag
Chi-Square
df
p-value
Full-service Restaurant Segment
12
14.1
8
0.078
24
28.0
20
0.110
36
41.0
32
0.133
48
57.5
44
0.083
Limited-service Restaurant Segment
12
10.0
8
0.265
24
27.8
20
0.113
36
32.6
32
0.439
48
40.1
44
0.637
Overall Restaurant Industry
12
9.8
8
0.280
24
27.8
20
0.115
36
34.6
32
0.343
48
42.1
44
0.553
S&P 500
12
13.0
8
0.111
24
24.4
20
0.225
36
33.1
32
0.415
48
45.0
44
0.431
Intervention Analyses
Time series intervention analysis was designed to test how the mean levels of a
time series differ before and after an exogenous event. For each of the four time
series, two intervention analyses were performed based on the ARIMA model to
identify possible significant impact and recovery during and after the recession. In
order to perform an intervention analysis, an event and the time it occurs needed
to be identified. Using the definition of recession (The National Bureau of
Economic Research, 2010), the two events used in this study were defined as the
start of the recession in the week of December 2, 2007 and the end of the
recession in the week of June 28, 2009.
However, it is common for events to have a lagged effect on a time series.
In other words, failing to identify significant decrease of the mean level in the
first week of the recession didn’t mean the stock index was immune to the
recession. Therefore, for each stock index, if no significant decrease of mean level
was detected in the first week of the recession, ARIMA with Intervention
analyses were repeatedly performed in the second week, the third week, the fourth
week, and so forth until a significant decrease was identified or the end of the data
set was reached. Identical analyses were performed for testing the recovery.

The time series used for intervention analyses varied among four indices.
For impact identifying, each time series comprised the weekly index from the
beginning of the data set, which was January 2, 2005, through the week during the
recession that had the lowest value. The rest of the time series were used for
recovery identification, with the time of intervention starting from the first week
after the recession ended. Tables 3 & 4 provide summary of the time series used
for intervention analyses. All Intervention analyses were performed based on
ARIMA(4,2,0) using SAS/ETS Time Series Forecasting System. Tables 5 & 6 list
the results of the analyses; and Table 7 is a summary of impacts and recoveries
identified.
Table 3. Weekly Time Series Used for Impact Identifying
Index
Beginning week / Value
Ending week / Value
Full-service Restaurants January 2, 2005 / 1186.19
Nov 16, 2008 / 440.11
51st week of the recession
Limited-service
January 2, 2005 / 1186.19 March 1, 2009 / 1366.07
Restaurants
66th week of the recession
Overall Restaurant
January 2, 2005 / 1186.19 Nov 16, 2008 / 1127.92
Industry
51st week of the recession
S&P 500
January 2, 2005 / 1186.19
March 1, 2009 / 683.38
66th week of the recession
Table 4. Weekly Time Series Used for Recovery Identifying
Index
Beginning week / Value
Ending week / Value
Full-service
Nov 23, 2008 / 493.08
Dec 26, 2010 / 1615.48
Restaurants
52nd week of the recession
Limited-service
Mar 8, 2009 / 1371.68
Dec 26, 2010 / 2110.15
Restaurants
67th week of the recession
Overall Restaurant
Nov 24, 2008 / 1196.76
Dec 26, 2010 / 1954.67
nd
Industry
52 week of the recession
S&P 500
Mar 8, 2009 / 756.55
Dec 26, 2010 / 1257.64
th
67 week of the recession
The results suggest that the stock performance of the limited-service
restaurant segment was immune to the recession. No significant decrease was
identified after the recession started. However, although the weekly LSR index
showed a steady increase after the recession ended (shown in Figure 1), no
significant increase of mean value was identified after the recession ended. On the
other hand, both impact and recovery were identified for the full-service
restaurant segment. In the week of December 2, 2007, the first week of the
recession, a significant decrease of 57.9 was identified (Table 5); and a significant

increase of 68.45 was identified in the week of December, 27, 2009, which was
twenty-seven weeks after the recession ended (Table 6). In other words, compared
to that of LSR, stock performance of the FSR was more sensitive to the changes
of market conditions and more volatile through and after the recession. As shown
in Figure 1, the FSR index has the steepest slope before and after the recession.
However, it seems that it took longer for FSR to start to recover from the
recession. The plot for FSR index (Figure 1) is flat between weeks 236 and 262,
which is between the end of the recession and the week the FSR index started
showing a significant increase and represents the lagged period for FSR to recover.
Significant impacts were also identified for the overall restaurant industry
index and S&P 500 index for 59.1 and 55.9, respectively. As shown in Table 5,
the OR index started showing a significant decrease in the first week of the
recession; but the S&P 500 index wasn’t significantly affected by the recession
until the week of August 31, 2008, the fortieth week of the recession. This
difference confirms the theory that the restaurant industry stocks are riskier and
more volatile than the overall market.
Due to its larger market cap (shown in Table 8), LSRs might have had
some influence on the results of this study even though no significant impact or
recovery was identified on LSR index. The decrease in the LSR index wasn’t
significant enough to be detected by the intervention analysis, but it did decrease
largely after the recession started, which might have contributed to the fluctuation
of the OR index and led to a slightly larger decrease on OR than on FSR (59.1 vs.
57.9). For the same possible reasons, no recovery was identified in the OR index
after the recession ended. Although the FSR index had a significant recovery of
68.5, it had a much smaller market cap than LSRs did and represented only about
22% of the OR market cap.
Figure 1. Grouped Plots of Four Weekly Time Series

Table 5. Impact Weeks Identified
Parameters
Estimate
Full-service Restaurant
AR(1)
-0.78174
AR(2)
-0.60145
AR(3)
-0.47249
AR(4)
-0.23549
week of Dec 2, 2007
-57.89853
Overall Restaurant Industry
AR(1)
-0.75963
AR(2)
-0.54605
AR(3)
-0.46647
AR(4)
-0.25657
week of Dec 2, 2007
-59.10428
S&P 500
AR(1)
-0.90615
AR(2)
-0.64130
AR(3)
-0.55621
AR(4)
-0.31220
week of Aug 31, 2008
-55.89321
Table 6. Recovery Week Identified
Parameters
Estimate
Full-service Restaurant Segment
AR(1)
-0.64142
AR(2)
-0.50531
AR(3)
-0.35685
AR(4)
-0.20233
week of Dec 27, 2009
68.44682

t-statistic

p value

-11.2492
-7.1521
-5.6248
-3.3462
-2.2619

< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
0.0010
0.0248

-11.4309
-6.9730
-5.9404
-3.8484
-2.3203

< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
0.0002
0.0213

-13.8599
-7.8289
-6.7582
-4.7076
-2.7161

< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
< .0001
0.0072

t-statistic

p value

-7.7949
-5.4614
-3.8705
-2.5271
1.9230

< .0001
< .0001
0.0002
0.0125
0.0563

Table 7. Summary of Impact and Recovery Weeks
Impact
Recovery
Full-service Restaurants
week of Dec 2, 2007
week of Dec 27, 2009
Limited-service Restaurants
No significant impact
No Significant Increase until 2010
Overall Restaurant Industry
week of Dec 2, 2007
Not recovered until 2010
S&P 500
week of Aug 31,2008
Not recovered until 2010

Table 8. Market Capitalization of Restaurant Segments (in thousands).
Week
Full-service
Limited-service
Overall
Restaurant
Restaurant Segment
Restaurant
Segment
(Proportion)
Industry
(Proportion)
(Proportion)
January 2, 2005
31,284,699
66,385,153
97,669,852
(32.03%)
(67.97%)
(100%)
December 2,
25,681,870
103,486,012
129,167,882
2007
(19.88%)
(80.12%)
(100%)
June 21, 2009
18,407,540
84,710,578
103,118,118
(17.85%)
(82.15%)
(100%)
December 26,
32,114,305
109,067,737
141,182,042
2010
(22.75%)
(77.25%)
(100%)
t-tests of Ratios
The results of ARIMA with Intervention analyses provided investors with insights
on the performance trends of three stock indices through the recession. To
understand how different segments behaved differently from a managers’
perspective and help managers make informed decisions in coping with possible
economic downturns in the future, this study further examined the changes of
financial ratios of LSRs and FSRs through the recession. Multiple t-tests were
performed to compare the average financial ratios. Paired Samples t-tests were
performed on the limited-service restaurant segment and full-service restaurant
segment to identify possible significant changes of financial ratios through the
recession. Results listed in Table 9 indicate that none of LSR segment’s financial
ratios significantly changed through the recession, which mirrors the findings of
the intervention analysis. Again, the LSR segment appears to be immune to the
recession.
However, the average Debt Ratio of FSRs showed significant increase and
Debt-to-Equity ratio of FSRs showed modestly significant increase through the
recession (shown in Table 10). By the end of the recession, about 56% of the
assets in FSR were financed with debt and approximate 80% of operating and
financing activities were financed with debt. The significant increases of these
two debt ratios imply that FSRs had difficult time raising funds from the stock
markets during the recession, which is also reflected by the 28.3% decrease of
FSR market cap through the recession.

Table 9. Results of paired samples t-test for limited service restaurants
Ratio
Average Average t-value
Sig.
before
after
two-tailed
recession recession
Liquidity
Current Ratio (n=15)
1.2964
1.2169
.389
.703
Quick Ratio (n=15)
.9862
.8312
.847
.411
Leverage
Debt Ratio (n=14)
.8064
.8573
-.336
.742
Debt-to-Equity (n=11)
3.7193
4.6282
-.357
.728
Times Interest Earned (n=15) 185.6669
1.266
.226
124.3671
Profitability
Gross Profit Margin (n=15)
.2865
.2831
.259
.800
Net Profit Margin (n=15)
.0761
.0447
.945
.361
Return on Investment (n=12)
.0853
.0548
.881
.397
Return on Stockholder’s Equity
.1470
.2060
-.363
.724
(n=11)
Asset Management
Inventory Turnover (n=15)
74.3498
73.4794
.236
.817
Total Asset Turnover (n=15)
1.7361
1.8559
-.692
.500
Market-based
P/E (n=15)
33.6460
19.6422
.643
.531
P/BV (n=15)
1.1329
7.0399
-1.684
.114
An Independent Samples t-test was performed to identify possible
differences between the financial ratios of LSRs and FSRs at the beginning of the
recession. The results listed in Table 11 indicate that Gross Profit Margin Ratios
were identified to be significantly different between the two segments and Debt
Ratios and P/E ratios were identified to be modestly significantly different
between two segments. Although the limited-service segment constantly had
higher Debt Ratio through the recession, its higher Gross Profit Margin might
have indicated promising earning growth, which consequently led to its higher
P/E ratio. This further explains LSR’s stronger stock performance through the
recession. Although the market cap of LSR shrunk about 18.1% during the
eighteen-month recession, versus 28.3% decrease of FSR, the debt ratios of LSR
didn’t show any significant changes through the recession (Table 9). In other
words, LSR might have difficulties raising funds through the recession, but the
increase of overall debt is not statistically significant.

Table 10. Results of paired samples t-test for full service restaurants
Sig.
Ratio
Average Average t-value
two-tailed
before
after
Recessio Recessio
n
n
Liquidity
Current Ratio (n=31)
1.1018
.9528
.944
.353
Quick Ratio (n=31)
.7938
.6613
.811
.424
Leverage
Debt Ratio (n=31)
.4167
.5621
-3.757
.001
Debt-to-Equity (n=30)
.8276
4.1277
-1.712
.098
Times Interest Earned (n=25)
81.4394
20.5291
1.324
.198
Profitability
Gross Profit Margin (n=31)
.2316
.2170
1.685
.102
Net Profit Margin (n=31)
-.0433
.0242
-.834
.411
Return on Investment (n=26)
.0758
.0554
1.515
.142
Return on Stockholder’s Equity
.0915
-.0172
1.613
.118
(n=30)
Asset Management
Inventory Turnover (n=30)
81.0008
72.6084
.777
.443
Total Asset Turnover (n=31)
1.4845
1.6203
-1.524
.138
Market - based
P/E (n=31)
19.2153
-2.8367
.686
.498
P/BV (n=31)
2.9048
3.7762
-.967
.341
Overall, this study found that the limited-service restaurant segment
weathered the recession well and no significant impact of the recession on the
segment was identified. In fact, four of the twenty limited service restaurant firms
had losses in the year before recession; and only two had losses in the year after
recession. Two of the four restaurants actually started to have earnings through
the recession. On the other hand, once the recession ended, the full-service
restaurant segment recovered very rapidly; but no significant increase of stock
index was identified for LSRs. In addition, although the restaurant industry seems
to be more volatile than overall market, the limited-service restaurant segment
appears to have less risk.

Table 11. Pre-recession results of independent samples t-tests.
Ratio
Average for Average for t-value
LimitedFullService
Service
Restaurants
Restaurants
Liquidity
Current Ratio (df=63)
1.2584
1.0462
.987
Quick Ratio (df=62)
.9132
.7284
.831
Leverage
Debt Ratio (df=21.771)
.6976
.4571
1.739
Debt-to-Equity (df=15.171)
2.7825
.9444
1.078
Times Interest Earned (df=56)
147.6913
63.2174
.557
Profitability
Gross Profit Margin (df=63)
.2722
.2130
2.031
Net Profit Margin (df=63)
.0711
-.0262
1.074
Return on Investment (df=50)
.1006
.1119
-.141
Return on Stockholder’s
.1401
.0722
1.398
Equity (df=53)
Asset Management
Inventory Turnover (df=58)
72.6091
79.5977
-.407
Total Asset Turnover (df=59)
1.7009
1.5623
.789
Market-based
P/E (df=63)
31.1338
.2202
1.705
P/BV(df=19.261)
1.3981
2.5298
-.878

Sig.
twotailed

.327
.409
.096
.298
.579
.046
.287
.888
.168

.686
.434
.093
.391

Summary of Results
Using the ARIMA with Intervention Analysis technique and t-tests, this study
examined nine hypotheses to explore the behaviors of performance trends of the
three restaurant stock indices (hypotheses #1 ~ #6) and changes in financial ratios
of different restaurant segments (hypotheses #7 ~ #9) through the recent recession.
The results of ARIMA analyses suggest that hypotheses #1, #4, and #6 to be
rejected and hypotheses #2, #3, and #5 not to be rejected (shown in Tables 5 & 6).
In addition, the t-tests identified significant differences among some of the
financial ratios in different restaurant segments through the recession (shown in
Tables 9, 10, and 11).
Discussion
The first thing to remark on is the weeks of impact and recovery of the restaurant
industry as a whole and the two individual industry segments being analyzed. In

the case of the industry as a whole, the week of December 2, 2007 is the week the
recession first had an impact on the stock prices of restaurant companies, and the
prices did not recover until the first part of 2010. This impact was mirrored by the
performance of full service restaurant stocks as well as the S&P 500 as a whole.
Interestingly, though, limited service restaurant stock prices were not significantly
affected by the recession at all, and therefore did not need to recover.
When looking at the paired sample t-test examining the financial
performance of full service restaurants, it is noted that full service restaurants took
on a significantly higher level of debt during the recent recession, both in terms of
debt ratio (p<0.05) and debt to equity ratio (p<0.1). While gross profit margin was
not significantly lower (p=0.102), the result of the t-test was very close to being
statistically significant. When examining these same numbers for the limited
service restaurant segment of the industry, there are no significant differences
found between pre- and post-recession financial performance.
These results demonstrate quite clearly that limited service restaurants
(LSRs), in general, survived the recession with much greater ease than full service
restaurants (FSRs). LSRs did not see a decline in stock price during the recession
and managed to maintain profitability without having to take on additional debt.
FSRs, on the other hand, managed to maintain their profit margins, if only just,
but did so at the expense of taking on greater debt.
These results are informative for industry on a number of levels. First is
the notion that the limited service restaurant segment was able to weather the
most severe recession in the United States since the Great Depression better than
the full service restaurant segment. Certainly, if investors can count on LSR
stocks not to decline in the face of such a sharp economic downturn, these sorts of
restaurants represent a far more secure investment than FSR, for investors and
operators alike.
Second, there is mounting evidence that the United States economy, while
technically not in recession, is not expected to rebound fully any time in the near
future (Barro, 2012). As of July 26, 2012, Treasury Real Yield Curve Rates – the
interest rates the United States government pays on bonds that are indexed to
inflation – were negative for all bonds of less than twenty years maturity (United
States Department of the Treasury, 2012) (see appendix c). In other words, for
every maturity of bonds under 20 years, investors are paying the federal
government to take their money. This suggests quite strongly that investors are
pessimistic about the ability of the U.S. economy to create significant gains in the
coming years (Krugman, 2012). Investor pessimism about prospects for the real
economy makes the perceived safe haven of U.S. debt attractive even at very low
yields (Krugman, 2012). For operators of FSRs, then, this suggests a major
realignment of strategic thinking is in order. Since the stock prices of these
companies first reacted to the recession in December, 2007, FSRs have purchased

continued profitability at the expense of ever greater debt. If the economy
continues as expected this is clearly not a sustainable course of action. Operators
of FSRs must quickly come to grips with the reality of the new, less vibrant
economy. For investors, this means moving money away from FSRs and into
LSRs might be in order.
Adding urgency this problem for FSRs is the notion that the U.S. economy
might be headed for a “double-dip” recession, and given that the European
economy is experiencing just such a recession, those fears may not be unjustified
(UK SME, 2012). Should the U.S. economy experience such a backslide; FSRs
will face more severe challenges given that it was significantly affected by the
recent recession and its overall debt ratios have worsened through the recession.
A change in strategic thinking on the part of FSR managers, therefore, is not only
a necessity, but a pressing one.
This study was limited by the fact that only publicly held restaurant
companies were surveyed. Privately owned companies and those not large enough
to have their stocks listed on large exchanges may have been affected differently
than larger concerns. Opportunities for further research include incorporating
these other companies into the research, as well as examining LSRs more closely
to determine whether they actually are “recession proof.”
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APPENDIX A: Financial Ratios
Ratio
Liquidity
Current Ratio

Formula
  
 



Quick Ratio

Current assets  inventories  prepaid expenses
current liabilities

Debt Ratio
Debt-to-Equity Ratio
Times Interest Earned Ratio
Profitability
Gross Profit Margin Ratio
Net Profit Margin Ratio
Return on Investment Ratio
Return on Stockholder’s Equity Ratio
Asset Management
Inventory Turnover Ratio
Total Asset Turnover
Market-based
Price-to-Earnings (P/E) Ratio
Market-to-Book (P/BV) Ratio

Total debt/ Total assets
Total debt/ Total equity
Earnings before interest and taxes/ Interest Charges

Leverage

Sales- Cost of sales/ sales (revenue)
Earnings after taxes (EAT)/sales
Earnings after taxes (EAT)/ Total assets
Earnings after taxes (EAT)/ Stockholders’ equity
Cost of sales/ Average inventory
Sales/ Total assets
Market price per share/ Current earnings per share
Market price per share/ Book value per share

APPENDIX B: Restaurant Firms
(identified through Mergent Online database)
722211 limited service (20)
722110 full service (49)
AFC Enterprises Inc.
AFCE Applebee's International, Inc.
APPB
Burger King Holdings Inc.
BKC
Ark Restaurants Corp.
ARKR
Caribou Coffee Inc.
CBOU
Back Yard Burgers, Inc.
BYBI
Carrols Restaurant Group
TAST
Benihana Inc.
BNHNA
Inc.
Checkers Drive-In
CHKR
Biglari Holdings Inc.
BH
Restaurants
CKE Restaurants, Inc.
CKR
BJ's Restaurants Inc.
BJRI
COSI Inc.
COSI
Bob Evans Farms, Inc.
BOBE
Domino’s Pizza Inc.
DPZ
Bravo Brio Restaurant Group BBRG
Inc.
Einstein Noah Restaurant
BAGL
Brinker International, Inc.
EAT

Group
Good Times Restaurants
Inc.
Jack in the Box, Inc.
McDonald's Corp
Nathan's Famous, Inc.
Papa John's International,
Inc.
Red Robin Gourmet Burgers
Inc.
Ryan's Restaurant Group
Inc.
Sonic Corp.
Wendy's International, Inc.
Worldwide Restaurant
Concepts
Yum! Brands, Inc.

GTIM

BUCA Inc.

BUCA

JACK
MCD
NATH
PZZA

Buffalo Wild Wings Inc.
California Pizza Kitchen Inc.
CEC Entertainment, Inc.
Champps Entertainment, Inc.

BWLD
CPKI
CEC
CMPP

RRGB

Cheesecake Factory Inc.

CAKE

RYAN

Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc.

CMG

SONC

Cracker Barrel Old Country
Store, Inc.
Darden Restaurants, Inc.
Denny's Corp

CBRL

WEN
SZ
YUM

DineEquity Inc.
Elmer's Restaurants, Inc.
Famous Dave's of America
Inc.
Flanigan's Enterprises, Inc.
Friendly Ice Cream Corp
Frisch's Restaurants, Inc.
Granite City Food &
Brewery Ltd
J. Alexander's Corp
Jamba Inc.
Kona Grill Inc.
Landry's Restaurants, Inc.
Lone Star Steakhouse &
Saloon, Inc.
Luby's, Inc.
Main Street Restaurant
Group Inc.
Max & Erma's Restaurants,
Inc.
McCormick & Schmicks
Seafood Restaurants Inc.
Morton's Restaurant Group
Inc.

DRI
DENN
DIN
ELMS
DAVE
BDL
FRN
FRS
GCFB
JAX
JMBA
KONA
LNY
STAR
LUB
MAIN
MAXE
MSSR
MRT

Mexican Restaurants, Inc.
O'Charley's Inc.
OSI Restaurant Partners Inc.
P.F. Chang's China Bistro,
Inc.
Panera Bread Co.
Quality Dining, Inc.
RARE Hospitality
International, Inc.
Rubio's Restaurants, Inc.
Ruby Tuesday, Inc.
Ruth's Hospitality Group Inc.
Star Buffet, Inc.
Texas Roadhouse Inc.
Western Sizzlin Corp
APENDIX C: Daily Treasury Real Yield Curve Rates
Date
5 YR
7 YR
10 YR
20 YR
07/02/12
-1.04
-0.81
-0.50
0.10
07/03/12
-1.08
-0.82
-0.48
0.14
07/05/12
-1.12
-0.86
-0.51
0.10
07/06/12
-1.12
-0.87
-0.53
0.08
07/09/12
-1.14
-0.89
-0.57
0.03
07/10/12
-1.16
-0.92
-0.59
0.01
07/11/12
-1.15
-0.90
-0.57
0.03
07/12/12
-1.13
-0.90
-0.58
0.00
07/13/12
-1.15
-0.91
-0.59
-0.01
07/16/12
-1.18
-0.94
-0.61
-0.02
07/17/12
-1.16
-0.92
-0.59
0.00
07/18/12
-1.19
-0.94
-0.60
0.00
07/19/12
-1.20
-0.97
-0.62
-0.01
07/20/12
-1.18
-0.98
-0.67
-0.08
07/23/12
-1.18
-0.98
-0.68
-0.09
07/24/12
-1.13
-0.95
-0.68
-0.11
07/25/12
-1.12
-0.94
-0.67
-0.10
Source: United States Department of the Treasury

30 YR
0.51
0.53
0.50
0.48
0.43
0.40
0.41
0.39
0.38
0.37
0.40
0.40
0.40
0.33
0.32
0.31
0.31

CASA
CHUX
OSI
PFCB
PNRA
QDIN
RARE
RUBO
RT
RUTH
STRZ
TXRH
WEST

